Discussion Forum > Article on Procrastination in the New Yorker
Seraphim,
I enjoyed this immensely. Thanks for posting it.
I found it stimulating to look at Mark's "brain power" post (for which you won the prize) to Surowiecki's article.
Mark's blog post on brain power emphasized maturation and development. In a subsequent post he even speculated that it might be possible to do SF3 entirely mentally.
In the context of the Surowiecki article, I read the thrust of Mark's post to be moving into the Kantian camp. As one uses SF3 repeatedly, the need for SF3 gradually withers away. There is no division within the brain-mind as disciplined work becomes its nature. The mind is a whole, working in an united and focused manner to accomplish the best task.
Since I am at the lowest possible level of SF3 (I started it this morning), my view is quite different. My experience is that SF3 is a technology, like the "extended will" notion in the New Yorker piece. "Akrasia," or weakness of will, is the product of the battle between different parts of mind.
Just like Ariely's students, I am going to use treachery and deception to overwhelm the part of my mind concerned with short-term rewards. Like his students I will create artificial deadlines that induce an intense sense of urgency powerful enough to cancel out those short-term rewards.
These artificial deadlines are . . . artificial. Thus, one might argue that the moral virtue which I exhibit when acting in accordance with these deadlines, is itself artificial virtue. So be it. I would rather have artificial virtue than authentic vice.
Mark's systems to my view are truly examples of what Surowiecki terms "self-binding." The beauty of Mark's systems is that they have me bind myself, or make a commitment to myself, that is much more powerful than the bonds I experience with any other system. The bonds are not real. But I experience them as powerful and that motivates me to act in accordance with the demands of the part of my mind concerned with longer-term rewards.
Perhaps, some day, I will become morally virtuous by acting morally virtuous. But, for now, I will be content to merely act morally virtuous. That is, I will be content to continue having a mind into parts, as long as my actions follow the part with the longer time horizon.
I enjoyed this immensely. Thanks for posting it.
I found it stimulating to look at Mark's "brain power" post (for which you won the prize) to Surowiecki's article.
Mark's blog post on brain power emphasized maturation and development. In a subsequent post he even speculated that it might be possible to do SF3 entirely mentally.
In the context of the Surowiecki article, I read the thrust of Mark's post to be moving into the Kantian camp. As one uses SF3 repeatedly, the need for SF3 gradually withers away. There is no division within the brain-mind as disciplined work becomes its nature. The mind is a whole, working in an united and focused manner to accomplish the best task.
Since I am at the lowest possible level of SF3 (I started it this morning), my view is quite different. My experience is that SF3 is a technology, like the "extended will" notion in the New Yorker piece. "Akrasia," or weakness of will, is the product of the battle between different parts of mind.
Just like Ariely's students, I am going to use treachery and deception to overwhelm the part of my mind concerned with short-term rewards. Like his students I will create artificial deadlines that induce an intense sense of urgency powerful enough to cancel out those short-term rewards.
These artificial deadlines are . . . artificial. Thus, one might argue that the moral virtue which I exhibit when acting in accordance with these deadlines, is itself artificial virtue. So be it. I would rather have artificial virtue than authentic vice.
Mark's systems to my view are truly examples of what Surowiecki terms "self-binding." The beauty of Mark's systems is that they have me bind myself, or make a commitment to myself, that is much more powerful than the bonds I experience with any other system. The bonds are not real. But I experience them as powerful and that motivates me to act in accordance with the demands of the part of my mind concerned with longer-term rewards.
Perhaps, some day, I will become morally virtuous by acting morally virtuous. But, for now, I will be content to merely act morally virtuous. That is, I will be content to continue having a mind into parts, as long as my actions follow the part with the longer time horizon.
March 23, 2011 at 2:35 |
moises
moises
Please look at Mark’s two blog posts on 17 and 18 March, 2011.
http://www.markforster.net/blog/2011/3/17/does-using-superfocus-increase-your-brain-power-my-answer.html
http://www.markforster.net/blog/2011/3/18/all-in-the-mind.html
In the first, he talks about SF developing brain power. In the second, he analogizes SF to the soroban, Japanese abacus.
The argument leads to a developmental view.
Stage 1: Subject has akrasia, weakness of will, manifested in procrastination.
Stage 2: Subject uses a material tool outside the mind (SF) to create an artificially strong will.
Stage 3: Subject develops habits of productivity.
One could argue that the subject needs Stage 2 because she was in Stage 1. Conversely, there is no need to use external tools if one possesses the internal asset of a strong will. (See also
http://www.markforster.net/blog/2006/9/9/three-types-of-urgent.html
where Mark calls these people “orderly people”.)
The question for me is how to characterize the person in Stage 3? Is she an orderly person? Is her will artificially or authentically strong?
This is comparable to asking if the person who solves arithmetical problems on a mental abacus as arithmetically strong as a person who intuitively solves arithmetical problems. Another example would be the kinds of mnemonic techniques used to remember lists of numbers, dates, people’s names, etc.
I would take the position that using a mental abacus is an artificial arithmetical intelligence. Using mnemonic techniques is an artificial memory. So, I am forced to acknowledge that using a mental SF system would make the user an artificially orderly person.
Accordingly, I would revise my previous post. I now longer believe that Mark defends a unitary notion of self. Rather, he is in the camp of those who view the self as divided. Because the self is divided, its natural will needs to be extended using artificial devices. These devices are material and external to the will initially. Mark raises the possibility that they could be mental and internal in more advanced practitioners. But, in either case, the artificial device is necessary to prevent the short-term self from gaining too much control.
http://www.markforster.net/blog/2011/3/17/does-using-superfocus-increase-your-brain-power-my-answer.html
http://www.markforster.net/blog/2011/3/18/all-in-the-mind.html
In the first, he talks about SF developing brain power. In the second, he analogizes SF to the soroban, Japanese abacus.
The argument leads to a developmental view.
Stage 1: Subject has akrasia, weakness of will, manifested in procrastination.
Stage 2: Subject uses a material tool outside the mind (SF) to create an artificially strong will.
Stage 3: Subject develops habits of productivity.
One could argue that the subject needs Stage 2 because she was in Stage 1. Conversely, there is no need to use external tools if one possesses the internal asset of a strong will. (See also
http://www.markforster.net/blog/2006/9/9/three-types-of-urgent.html
where Mark calls these people “orderly people”.)
The question for me is how to characterize the person in Stage 3? Is she an orderly person? Is her will artificially or authentically strong?
This is comparable to asking if the person who solves arithmetical problems on a mental abacus as arithmetically strong as a person who intuitively solves arithmetical problems. Another example would be the kinds of mnemonic techniques used to remember lists of numbers, dates, people’s names, etc.
I would take the position that using a mental abacus is an artificial arithmetical intelligence. Using mnemonic techniques is an artificial memory. So, I am forced to acknowledge that using a mental SF system would make the user an artificially orderly person.
Accordingly, I would revise my previous post. I now longer believe that Mark defends a unitary notion of self. Rather, he is in the camp of those who view the self as divided. Because the self is divided, its natural will needs to be extended using artificial devices. These devices are material and external to the will initially. Mark raises the possibility that they could be mental and internal in more advanced practitioners. But, in either case, the artificial device is necessary to prevent the short-term self from gaining too much control.
March 23, 2011 at 13:09 |
moises
moises
I largely agree moises, but I question the importance of distinguishing artificial from natural. Especially when you internalize a device, all that's left is a way of thinking. In that case, most of our thinking is governed by patterns we were taught, and it's pointless to call it all artificial. I would conclude: tools help us. We use them, and things go better.
There is no reason to drop the tools, unless of course we have outgrown them and can do equally well without. I expect in the case of SuperFocus that extended use of the tool will lead us to better habits even when the list is missing, but the ability to write stuff is the ability to perfect our recall, and the SF format is just a good idea then.
There is no reason to drop the tools, unless of course we have outgrown them and can do equally well without. I expect in the case of SuperFocus that extended use of the tool will lead us to better habits even when the list is missing, but the ability to write stuff is the ability to perfect our recall, and the SF format is just a good idea then.
March 23, 2011 at 13:52 |
Alan Baljeu
Alan Baljeu
I don't think there's any substantive difference (in regard to "natural" vs "artificial") between the person doing arithmetic on a mental abacus and a person who "intuitively solves arithmetical problems". Any but the most simple mathematics requires a discipline and structure of artificial origin. For some, the mere introduction of such discipline and structure is enough to get them started performing complex arithmetic in their head. Others need more development of that discipline and structure -- perhaps a mental abacus -- to perform at the same level. Both are "artificial" constructs -- the difference is a matter of degree, not kind.
The brain is already structured ("pre-wired") to an astonishing degree; viz. the ability of young children to obtain new languages.
So I think I agree with Alan. Or at least I'd say that this distinction between "artificial" and "natural" needs to be more closely analyzed and defined before we draw definite conclusions about their relationship.
In regard to whether personhood is unitary or divided, I'd propose that, at the very least, personhood is self-referencing -- which makes things very interesting. Douglas Hofstadter explores this idea in great lengths with his idea of "strange loops"; cf. his book "I Am A Strange Loop" and his classic "Goedel Escher Bach", both of which explore the meaning and origin of personhood and consciousness. I strongly disagree with his ultimate conclusions and many of the arguments which lead him to those conclusions, but I still find plenty of engaging and worthwhile ideas in these books.
The brain is already structured ("pre-wired") to an astonishing degree; viz. the ability of young children to obtain new languages.
So I think I agree with Alan. Or at least I'd say that this distinction between "artificial" and "natural" needs to be more closely analyzed and defined before we draw definite conclusions about their relationship.
In regard to whether personhood is unitary or divided, I'd propose that, at the very least, personhood is self-referencing -- which makes things very interesting. Douglas Hofstadter explores this idea in great lengths with his idea of "strange loops"; cf. his book "I Am A Strange Loop" and his classic "Goedel Escher Bach", both of which explore the meaning and origin of personhood and consciousness. I strongly disagree with his ultimate conclusions and many of the arguments which lead him to those conclusions, but I still find plenty of engaging and worthwhile ideas in these books.
March 23, 2011 at 20:56 |
Seraphim
Seraphim
The terms "authentic" and "artificial" are not the issue. The issue is the distinction and the distinction is real.
Ulysses was artificially virtuous. That is, he bound himself so that when he heard the sirens' songs, he could not succumb to their temptations. This is virtue, because he acted well, but it is artificial, since the urge to succumb was still strong.
There was a part of his self that wanted to resist and a part that wanted to succumb.
If we internalize SF so thoroughly that there is no longer a part that wants to be ruled by short-term consequences, then SF has transformed us. What was artificial will becomes authentic will.
If we continue to feel an internal struggle, and continue to rely on SF to get us to act in accord with the part ruled by long-term consequences, then SF has not transformed us. We still have the divided self. We act virtuously, yes. But we cannot act virtuously without the aid of the SF technique.
Ulysses was artificially virtuous. That is, he bound himself so that when he heard the sirens' songs, he could not succumb to their temptations. This is virtue, because he acted well, but it is artificial, since the urge to succumb was still strong.
There was a part of his self that wanted to resist and a part that wanted to succumb.
If we internalize SF so thoroughly that there is no longer a part that wants to be ruled by short-term consequences, then SF has transformed us. What was artificial will becomes authentic will.
If we continue to feel an internal struggle, and continue to rely on SF to get us to act in accord with the part ruled by long-term consequences, then SF has not transformed us. We still have the divided self. We act virtuously, yes. But we cannot act virtuously without the aid of the SF technique.
March 23, 2011 at 23:31 |
moises
moises
This reads much differently from your previous post. I agree with you now.
March 23, 2011 at 23:42 |
Alan Baljeu
Alan Baljeu
http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/books/2010/10/11/101011crbo_books_surowiecki?currentPage=all